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in their infancy. In order to develop these concepts, the right conceptual models need to 
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and network centric warfare are fundamentally based on trust decisions. However, the key 
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Mankind has had an agrarian existence for at least ten thousand years. 
Chnstianity is almost two thousand years old. The New World was 
“discovered” a little over five hundred years ago. Industrial development 
started approximately two hundred years ago. The age of the Internet, with 
the development of the World Wide Web, is five years old (Power, 1999). 
A. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND TRUST 
With the explosion of information technology over the past decade and the rapid 
move fiom an industrial-based economy to one which is information based, the concepts 
of Network Centric Warfare and Information Operations (10) have become increasingly 
integrated to our national strategy and the conduct of military operations. In practice, 
however, these concepts remain very loosely defined. 
Information technology has created a world where huge amounts of data can be 
transported nearly instantaneously. While this has spawned many new corporations and 
fortunes, it has presented many problems. Security, privacy, authenticity, integrity are all 
issues associated with the new economy. 
How does an individual verify the identity of another entity over a network? 
Further, how does one verify the quality and integrity of the data he receives over the 
same network? These problems are somewhat trivial in the cases of an Internet chat room, 
or e-mail. They may cause some embarrassment if the real identity is revealed, or a 
widespread nuissance in the case of an e-mail virus. 
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But what if a corporation is negotiating with another corporation? If the data to be 
exchanged is stolen, corrupted, altered, or tampered with, huge amounts of money may be 
lost. In planning a military operation, the lives of many people may depend on the 
integrity of key information. 
Technology has presented us with these problems, but it also offers a solution. 
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKT) was designed to solve key management problems. 
However, it has created trust management problems. 
Trust in any system is paramount to the proper function of the system. We take 
our money to a barik because trust it will be there when we want to withdraw it. We travel 
on airplanes because we trust the airlines to transport us from Point A to Point B safely 
and in a reasonable amount of time. We report suspicious behavior to the proper law 
enforcement officials because we trust they will investigate and take the correct action. 
We trust these systems as well as many others. Sometimes our trust is misplaced but there 
are mechanisms in place to correct the system when the system is deemed untrustworthy. 
B. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
There are several domains in which the United States exchanges and stores its 
information. Joint doctrine recognizes three: the Global Information Infrastructure (GII), 
the U.S. National Information Infrastructure (NII), and the Defense Information 
Infrastructure (DII). 
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Figure 1. Information Infrastructure (From Joint Publication 3-13) 
Each infrastructure maintains its own characteristic system of interconnected 
computers, communications networks, databases, sensors, software, operators, and other 
elements which serve the information processing demands of the users within the 
Department of Defense, United States Government, and the entire world. 
C. INFORMATION SECURITY 
In the computing evolution from standalone and mainframe computers to 
networks of personal computer workstations, systems have become more vulnerable to 
attack. User trust in the Internet has eroded as reports of vulnerabilities (e.g., bugs) and 
threats (e.g., hacker exploits) appear in the news. As the Internet continues to expand, 
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uncertainty and risk of compromising confidential information from hostile or careless 
users also expands. (Gaines, 2000) 
The Web has rapidly evolved from its original purpose as a research tool 
(ARPANET) to a worldwide forum for conducting diverse electronic transactions. 
Industry, government, and private citizens have become dependent on the global 
communication channels provided by the Internet. Worldwide connectivity has brought 
us closer to becoming the “global village” envisioned by some, while also introducing 
both threats and vulnerabilities. (Friedman, 1999) 
Modem, high-speed, networked systems have created a number of new threats and 
vulnerabilities. Networks are vulnerable to attack from multiple areas and from a long 
distance. Attacks can arise from inside the network or externally through the Internet. If 
a machine is connected to an external network, physical security is only part of the 
security equation. The same paths which allow remote access also afford access paths to 
attackers. 
The expansion of remote login capability has also introduced additional 
vulnerabilities. Usually, a modem would offer one service, the ability to login. The 
ability to send mail and perform other tasks was channeled through this single choke 
point. With the advent of networking, multiple services were offered such as FTP, login, 
disk access, remote execution, and system status. These services add to the number of 
things that must be addressed when protecting computer assets. (Chestwick, B. and 
Bellovin, S. ,  1994) 
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Networked systems also integrate numerous computer components and 
communication systems. A network is only as secure as the most vulnerable component 
on the network. Organizations purchase software and hardware from commercial 
vendors, so they have little or no influence on the design of the COTS component and 
may not possess any detailed information on the internal workings of those components. 
Hence, users may have to rely on the trustworthiness and claims of the manufacturers as 
to the security of these components. Additionally, it is difficult to predict or know what 
can and cannot happen within any complex system and what can be done to control the 
behavior of that system (National Research Council, 1999). 
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Modem networks present several security problems. In order to establish trust in 
such a computing environment, the public must be convinced that the threats associated 
with vulnerabilities can be controlled or prevented. Unfortunately, security vulnerabilities 
are difficuit to identify until they have been breached. Moreover they cannot be 
controlled. 
1. Information Attack Vulnerabilities 
Virus attacks have increased the risk associated with being connected to the 
Internet and as a result they have contributed to distrust of the Internet. A virus is a piece 
of software which self-replicates from host to host. A virus can be malicious code 
embedded in an executable program that will perform undesirable tasks such as deleting 
files, interfering with memories and slowing down processing speeds. Viruses used to be 
spread through infected floppy disks, however, today they tend to be attached to e-mail, 
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downloadable programs, and mobile code. The first two known major malicious virus 
attacks occurred in late 1987. (Kabay, M., 1996) This attack was spread through a 
university computer lab via infected floppy disks. 
Reportedly, there are about 46,000 different viruses. The costs of a virus attack 
vary, although an USA Research study reported costs at $800 per PC infected. (Kabay, 
M., 1996) Large attacks have resulted in costs of over one million dollars. Although the 
use of anti-virus software is more prevalent than ever before, those creating viruses are 
also becoming more sophisticated. 
People must exercise caution when downloading programs from untrusted 
sources. Sometimes programs advertised as shareware or fi-eeware may contain a Trojan 
horse. A Trojan horse is an apparently useful and innocent looking program that has 
undetectable malicious functions. An example is a computer-based game that when 
installed also copies private files and e-mails them to another site. Common trojan horse 
programs are detectable by antiviral software, but some, like the new Back Orifice 
program contain polymorphic stealth technology and are difficult to detect. 
A back door is an unauthorized and undocumented path for accessing information. 
Sometimes a programmer will intentionally install a back door for maintenance purposes, 
or it can be an undocumented feature of the program that allows a rogue user special 
privileges. Back doors are usually inserted via Trojan horse programs, but they have also 
been found in commercially provided s o h a r e  packages as well. (Gaines, 2000) Robert 
Morris utilized a back door in the debug option for the sendmail program in the UNIX 
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system to launch his worm attack. They can be installed in software during manufacturing 
or distribution. Trap doors are very difficult to detect. (Kabay, M., 1996) 
The topologies and protocols which make it possible for networks to 
communicate with each other also makes them vulnerable to packet sniffing. When a 
packet is sent on an Ethernet or Token Ring local area network (LANs), all of the 
computers on that LAN will receive the message. Then each computer will read the 
packet header information to determine the destination address. If the destination address 
agrees with their machine address, they accept the packet; otherwise they discard the 
packets. A sniffer is a device that monitors the traffic along the LAN and instead of 
discarding packets; it captures and copies them. By putting a network interface card 
(NIC) card in promiscuous mode, all traffic along the LAN can be read. This 
vulnerability is used by hackers to gain information on passwords, credit cards, and other 
private information. (Comer, 1999) 
2. The Hacker Threat 
Hackers are people who exploit information systems either for their own 
amusement or to commit criminal acts. Hackers are able to access systems by using the 
pathways provided by the Internet to utilize those flaws in software and operating 
systems. Many companies will not report penetrations of their security systems, so it is 
difficult to measure the damage inflicted by hackers. They fear that exposure of security 
incidents will undermine public confidence in their computing systems and the safeguard 
of the hnds and private information. 
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Hackers have gained a great deal of notoriety in the press and in movies. 
“WarGames”, “Whiz Kids”, and The Cuckoo’s Egg, are notable examples. Hackers are 
portrayed as resourceful, clever, gifted, but misunderstood individuals. Many hackers 
themselves defend their actions by saying they perform a service by exposing security 
flaws. This may, in fact, be true. But, hackers also directly contribute to the public’s 
distrust of the computer as a secure mechanism for facilitating information flow. Hackers 
have exposed the public to the realization that there are security vulnerabilities in the 
Internet and computing systems. ”.* (Gaines, 2000) 
A common misconception is that hackers are ingenious programmers. There are a 
few hackers who fall into this category. But the vast majority are using downloadable 
software, designed by other people, and easily obtained through the Internet. Step-by-step 
instructions on how to use these programs are often available. One particularly attractive 
hacker ivebsite, www.infonvar.co.ak/articles/simpnt4.htm, Lopht crack (a program for 
cracking passwords), getadmin and crack4.exe (used to insert a user account into the 
password file) are readily available for download. Back Orifice 2000 can be downloaded 
from the Cult of the Dead Cow homepage. (Gaines, 2000) 
The widespread reports of computer hacking have seriously damaged the trust we 
have in any computer network. As soon as a new product is released - whether it be 
software or hardware - a litany of security vulnerabilities and available patches is sure to 
follow. Computer security is a battle which is fought every day and must be managed and 
weighed against cost and other factors. Unless a machine is completely isolated from all 
other systems, and therefore virtually useless, it will be vulnerable to attack. 
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3. Trust in Systems 
'While the Internet is an untrustworthy entity, there are mechanisms that an 
organization can install that will ensure a measure of trust in that organization. (Gaines, 
2000) Computer security is typically described in terms of confidentiality, authentication, 
nonrepudiation, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality means that private information 
is accessible only to those authorized to access it. Authentication identifies the actual 
sender of a message. Nonrepudiation means a user cannot disavow himself from an 
action he has already taken. Integrity means that the message itself has not been modified. 
Availability ensures that the network and the information contained in the network are 
accessable when needed. No single security mechanism can provide complete security, 
but by combining different security mechanisms we can provide a reasonable level of 
trust in the system. 
Authentication is usually done by challenging a user with something he knows, 
something he has, or something he is. A common authentication is the password, which 
is something the user knows. Personal identification numbers (PINS) are another 
example. Identification or smart cards, badges, are examples of something the user has. 
Authentication procedures will typically combine something a person has with an object 
he possesses, such as an ATM card with a PIN number, or a username and password. 
Biometric devices such as eye scanners, fingerprints, and voice authenticatiors, make use 
of a person's unique physical characteristics. 
Digital signatures are used to verify the integrity of information. They are formed 
by combining a public key algorithm with a hashed algorithm. The original message is 
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run through the hash algorithm. The hash value is attached to the message and to the 
recipient. The recipient verifies the-hash by putting the message through the same hash 
algorithm again. If the message has been modified in transit, the hash values will not 
match. The hash value itself is encrypted with the sender’s private key. The receiver 
verifies the hash by decrypting it with the sender’s public key. A digital signature 
provides authenticity as well as non-repudiation, because the private key identifies the 
sender. In the United States, digital signatures are now recognized by law as legitimate 
forms of proof of signature for legal transactions. 
Availability is dependent on a number of factors. Network configuration, 
bandwidth, user training, security, weather, just to name a few. An official from the 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) stated that most organizations regard 
availability as the most important quality of a system. (Schimmel, 2000) In order to help 
maintain availability, firewalls can be installed to prevent unwanted packets from 
entering the system and disrupting service (i.e. a message flood, denial of service attack). 
Intrusion detection systems can alert network managers when an unauthorized user is 
exploring the system. These measures have costs associated with them. A tight firewall 
also degrades system performance. Intrusion detection systems are reactionary and only 
notify us that someone is or was in the network. 
“The degree to which a system can provide authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, 
and availability determines the level of risk associated with that system. The extent to 
which a system is secure helps establish the level of trust afforded to a system.” (Gaines, 
2000) Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to judge a system’s security posture unless 
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one is intimately familiar with it, or it has been evaluated by a reputable outside agency. 
The Internet is a “network of networks,” each with its own security postures, policies and 
thresholds. Thus, it is extremely difficult to evaluate trust among entities on the Internet. 
In today’s world of electronic commerce, trust has become an important asset. An 
untrusted organization will probably not be able to do business and may eventually fail. 
Many transactions today, are not done face to face. They are done via desktop, networks, 
video-teleconference, and in some cases by intelligent agents. Money changes hands but 
this takes place via electronic funds transfer. Handshakes are quickly becoming a thing of 
the past. Traditional legal methods of paper contracts and signatures that legally bind 
entities to that contract are inadequate. 
The security policies of an organization are important in determining its 
trustworthiness. But there are other factors. After verifying the integrity, confidentiality 
and authenticity of the data, how reliable is the person or people who provided you with 
the information. Public key certificates are useless if the person who owns the key is 
unreliable. If trust is to be injected into our basic communications systems to conduct 
day-to-day business, trust itself must be understood and effectively managed. 
D. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Traditional cryptographic methods have been around for thousands of years. 
Julius Caesar used encryption methods to send important communications to his generals 
and his allies. The process was simple. To use conventional names, Alice would take a 
message, M. Encrypt M, using a key, K to get an encrypted message, MK. She would 
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then send the encrypted message, MK, to the intended receiver, Bob. The receiver would 
then decrypt MK, using the same key, K. The result: the original plaintext message, M. 
There are problems, however, with this system of symmetric encryption. Namely, 
how does the sender get the key safely to the intended receiver. This would usually 
necessitate some predetermined arrangement of which keys to use on a given day, or for a 
certain type of message. Also, there is no mechanism to authenticate the originator of the 
message, or that the contents of the message had not been altered en route to its 
destination. Additionally, if the message is intercepted, the strength of the encryption 
technique is called into question. A weak encryption technique means it is possible the 
message will be decrypted by the enemy and its contents compromised. 
E n t e r p r i s e  
A p p l i c a t i o n s  
Figure 2. Public Key Infrastructure 
Public key cryptographic methods solve each of these problems. The public key 
system uses two keys; one public and one private. The RSA algorithm, developed in 
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1977, allows a message to be encrypted with one key and decrypted with a different key. 
The Public Key Infrastructure ( P a )  is based on this asymmetric type of encryption. 
Assymetric keying works as follows. Alice wants to send an encrypted message to 
Bob. She contacts a Certification Authority (CA) which maintains a database of public 
keys or certificates. The CA verifies Alice’s identity and transmits her Bob’s public key. 
She then encrypts the message using Bob’s public key and transmits it to Bob. When Bob 
receives the message he decrypts it using his private key which he is responsible for, 
similar to an ID card. He then has the plaintext message. 
If Alice had also wanted to provide a digital signature, she could do so by running 
the message through a hash function which provides a summary of the message. She then 
would encrypt this hash code with her private key and attach it to the end of her message. 
In order to verify that the message was indeed sent by Alice, Bob would simply use her 
public key to decrypt the code and apply the same hash function. 
E. PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
While public key encryption solves many classical problems associated with 
traditional encryption methods, it also brings with it some problems of its own. As new 
forms of encryption become available, new forms of attack will tend to follow. 
Consideration of several new forms of attack must be made before we envoke our trust in 
the system. 
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1. Key Management Attacks 
Certificate Authorities (CA) carry an enormous responsibility in the PKI system 
and represent a single point of failure. If the security practices of the CA are breached, the 
confidence in those identities that are verified by that CA are called into question. 
2. Total System Collapse 
The RSA algorithm, upon which the public key system is based, relies on the 
difficulty of prime factoring extremely large numbers. For example, find the prime factors 
of 73 1. The answer would be 17 and 43. But the problem would be much more difficult if 
the number to factor was 400 digits in length. If any significant advances, however 
unlikely, occur in the field of mathematics, particularly computational number theory, the 
public key method could quickly become vulnerable. It would then be disastrous if our 
sole method for keeping data secure was based upon this algorithm. 
3. Security of Certificates 
Most practical implementations of PKI require a product termed a “smart card.” 
Similar in appearance to a credit card or a driver’s license, the “smart card” carries the 
necessary personal and PKI data to complete the authentication and digital signature 
process. Presumably, the card would be carried in one’s wallet or purse for easy 
accessibility. Several European countries have begun the use of prototype cards. In 
Finland, a card produced by International Data Group (IDG) is used to conduct secure 
electronic transactions nationwide. They call their cards electronic identification or EID 
cards. 
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But what are the mechanisms to prevent false cards from being produced? How is 
identity theft prevented? What if a card is lost? How does a CA revoke priviledges once 
they have been granted? 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following questions will be addressed in this thesis: 
1. What is the Discretionary-Mandatory @M) trust model? 
2. How does the D-M model apply to DoD systems? 
3. What is trust? 
4. How does trust apply to Information Operations? 
5. What does trust mean to the military commander? 
6. How does the D-M model facilitate trust inside an organization? 
7. How does the D-M model facilitate trust between organizations? 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Information Security 
Information security is a multi-disciplinary occupation. Among the broad range of 
subjects are cryptography, computer science, and communications technology. 
Cryptography is an age-old practice and as such is well-documented. A highly 
recommended source and most comprehensive reference is Bruce Schneier’s book 
Applied Cryptography. (Schneier, B., 1996) There are many authors who discuss modem 
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computer security. This thesis will rely on textual material including Computer Networks 
and Internets by Douglas Comer, Security in Computing by Charles Pfleeger, and 
Information Warfare and Security by Dorothy Denning. 
2. Trust Models 
The subject of trust models is well-developed in the business world. However, it 
has rarely been applied to information technology and trusted electronic systems. Trust In 
Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, a collaborative work by Roderick M. 
Kramer and Tom R. Tyler, describes a scientific approach to trust models in business 
organizations. For current research regarding trust models, this thesis will rely heavily on 
the work of Professor Alfarez Abdul-Rahman, University College London, and Professor 
Audon Josang, University of Queensland. They provide the most extensive and insightfbl 
research on the principles of trust and trust modeling. 
3. Information Operations 
hmna t ion  Operations is still in its genes,; phase, however, a great deal of 
literature already exists on the subject. Joint Publication 3-13 will be the primary source 
for formal DoD definitions. Several key authorities in various DoD and other 
governmental agencies will be consulted for their views and opinions as well. These 
agencies will include, but are not limited to, the National Security Agency (NSA), 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT). 
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H. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THESIS 
The concept of trust and trust modeling is taking root in the development of 
information systems and security. Many trust models have already been developed and 
submitted for integration into security systems. Unfortunately, many of these models 
reflect an either/or mentality. They either support a distributed architecture or a centrally 
controlled architecture. Further, they do not recognize trust as an organizational concept. 
The Discretionary-Mandatory model, submitted for review is not a trust model. It 
is an organizational model, which, when applied supports flexibility and timely decision- 
making processes while also providing standardization across many different 
organizations. 
I. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter I1 will provide a scientific explanation of trust and trust models. Further, 
it will state the case of why trust is important in any system, but particularly a virtual 
system with no apparent means of authentification other than with digital encryption 
measures. 
Chapter III will explain the definitions and concepts of Information Operations 
and explain why, in the age of globalization and information technology, the concept of 
trust is critical to the military’s notion of Information Operations. 
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Chapter IV will present for review a new model which more accurately reflects 
trust decisions. Called the Discretionary-Mandatory (D-M) model, it will be based on the 
concept of some centrally enforced rules and some locally enforced rules. 
Chapter V will describe a case study in which the D-M model will be applied in 
practice in a combat decision sequence. Chapter VI will consist of conclusions and 
recommendations for future research. 
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11. WHY IS TRUST IMPORTANT? 
Dennis saw the hacker problem in terms of social morality. “We’ll 
always find a few dodos poking around our data. I’m worried about how 
hackers poison the trust that’s built our networks. After years of trying to 
hook together a bunch of computers, a few morons can spoil everything.” 
I didn’t see how trust had anything to do with it. “Networks are 
little more than cables and wires,” I said. 
“And an interstate highway is just concrete, asphalt, and bridges?’ 
Dennis replied. “You’re seeing the crude physical apparatus-the wires and 
communications. The real work isn’t laying wires, it’s agreeing to link 
isolated communities together. It’s figuring out who’s going to pay for 
maintenance and improvements. It’s forging alliances between groups that 
don’t trust each other.” 
“Like the military and universities, huh?” I said, thinking of the 
Internet. 
“Yes, and more.” (Stolle, 1990) 
A. \\‘HAT IS TRUST? 
Defining and quantifymg trust is difficult. Gerck defines trust as “that which is 
essential to a communication channel but cannot be transferred from a source to a 
destination using that channel”. (Gerck, 1998) This is somewhat abstract and difficult to 
conceptualize. A more common approach would be to compare information and trust; 
information is what you do not expect and trust is what you know and can verify. (Gerck, 
1998) Information systems are built to transfer and store information. To clarify, if one 
receives a piece of data which is already known, he has not enhanced his concept of 
reality and has received no information. If, however, he receives data which was not 
known, he has value added and has received information. 
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Trust in a system is what allows a system to work. Without it nothing else matters. 
The banking system works because its users trust in the system. Most of us have never 
personally met the management of the institution with which we conduct our banking 
transactions, we do not review their balance sheets, we do not check the source code of 
their computer systems for errors, and we do not run background checks on bank 
employees. But we trust OUT bank with our money; at least most of it. Why? Because 
there are mechanisms in place, namely federal banking laws, which give us a measure of 
trust in the system, provide a system of accountability of the institution itself, and a social 
penalty for abuse of untrustworthy behavior. 
Fundamentally, trust is a belief. This belief may be conditioned on personal 
knowledge, examination, individual qualifications, certificates from recognized and 
trusted authorities, negotiation, established commonalities, and experimentation over 
time. Beliefs are usually hard to establish, but easier to call into question or disestablish. 
Trust, once given - then broken, is most difficult to reestablish. It is the reestablishment 
that we must deal with in our information systems as the most problematic, that is trust 
management. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST THEORY 
SociaI scientists have used a “rational choice” model for describing genera1 social 
behavior and decision-making for the past few decades. This model is based upon the 
belief that people are, in general, compelled to maximize their personal gain and 
minimize their personal losses. This leads to a general inability to achieve cooperation in 
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many social environments, namely the business and professional environment. It also 
breaks down due to an inability of people to accurately assess their own self-interests. In 
the absence of formal trust and accountability mechanisms, both of these decision 
stimulae account for a general lack of trust among even close associates. Tyler and 
Kramer state that, “People have, in fact, been found to have difficulty effectively building 
cooperation in negotiations with others.” (Kramer & Tyler, 1996) 
In recent years, this “rational choice” model has been questioned in its accuracy to 
describe our social behavior. Kramer describes a more accurate model as “social 
contextualism” because it views “individuals as fundamentally and essentially social 
decision makers.” (Kramer 1994) How is trust perceived in a model of social 
contextualism? According to Kramer and Tyler, 
American society is moving away from supporting long-term social 
connections between individuals and between individuals and 
organizations. In the family arena, the emergence of no-fault divorce 
discourages long-term interpersonal commitments. In work, the 
development of the “contingent workforce” discourages loyalty to work 
organizations. In this evolving world, people increasingly cannot count on 
loyalty to others as a basis for reciprocity. They cannot trust others. A 
wife, for example, cannot point out to her husband that she abandoned her 
career to raise their family and expect to invoke an obligation that will be 
honored, just as workers cannot loyally support their organization over the 
years and expect that organization to place a high priority on their pension 
needs. In a world without such reciprocal obligations, it is hardly 
surprising that people are interested in learning how to negotiate 
effectively to protect their self-interests. (Kramer & Tyler, 1996) 
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Organizational structures are changing. The speed at which information and data 
moves today is forcing changes to be made in traditional hierarchial and bureaucratic 
organizations; these organizations are disappearing and being replaced by lateral alliances 
and social relations. This necessitates more freedom of action by the individual which, in 
turn, creates a need for mechanisms to apply trust to information systems. 
C. THE COST OF DISTRUST 
Trust can be considered an asset for an organization. It has a cost, but that cost 
diminishes over time as the organization maintains trusted relationships with other 
organizations. “It is the expectation of an ongoing relationship that sustains trust in the 
actions of others. (Kramer & Tyler, 1996) For example, a startup company relies on 
several new employees at all levels of management. Presumably, these employees have 
never met each other and have no established relationship. It will take time to develop 
trust among fellow workers and until trust is developed, production time will lag, ceteris 
parzbus. But once trust is cultivated and developed in the organization, tasks will be 
completed much sooner, production time will quicken and costs will decrease. 
Cultivating trust in an organization should be a major goal of management. 
Additionally, the same company will want to develop business relationships with 
other companies. Initially, the trust factor will be low. The possibility of failure on 
another company’s part will have to be accounted for in the company’s operational plans. 
However, as business and interpersonal relationships develop, management will have a 
better understanding of what companies they can trust to meet their commitments and 
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what companies they cannot trust. More accurate plans can be developed, coordination 
can be more tightly synchronized, and both fixed and variable costs will fall. 
Conversely, if an organization does not cultivate trusted relationships, inside and 
outside of the organization, the lack of trust will result in increased cost because 
management will continually be forced to re-evaluate relationships and account for the 
possibility of untrustworthy behavior. 
D. TRUST AND PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
PKI is a means to develop and exchange credentials (keys) that validate the 
authenticity of each party and establish a trusted common session to perform an action. 
“Trust, as a subjective assessment made whenever information is used, is influenced by a 
variety of factors which vary based upon the person making the trust assessment.” 
(Hansen, 1999) “Common factors that affect trust include privacy, operational necessity, 
risk assessment, and security services provided. Public key infrastructures are said to 
support or transfer trust because they facilitate the provision of security and/or privacy 
services with an established level of assurance.” (Hansen, 1999) Simply validating the 
identity of a user does not necessarily infer trust. An individual is still free to question the 
legitimacy and accuracy of information coming from another user, even after his identity 
has been verified. There is still an element of risk and risk management involved in the 
transaction. As secure as the RSA algorithm might be, it still cannot counter the adage, 
“garbage in, garbage out.” 
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E. TRANSITIVITY OF TRUST 
There is a common assumption when describing trusted systems: the assumption 
that trust is somehow transitive. For example, if Alice trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Cathy, 
then Alice should and will trust Cathy. Trust is transitive under certain conditions. 
Abdul-Rahman & Hailes propose the four conditions under which trust may be 
transferred: 
a) Bob explicitly communicates his trust in Cathy to Alice, as a ‘recommendation’ 
b) Alice trusts Bob as a recommender, that is, recommender trust exists in the system 
c) Alice is allowed to make judgements about the ‘quality’ of Bob’s recommendation 
(based on Alice’s policies) 
d) Trust is not absolute, that is, Alice may trust Cathy less than Bob does, based on Bob’s 
recommendation 
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes term this situation conditional transititivity. 
F. TRUST AND OPEN SYSTEMS 
An enormous problem which affects the internet as well as mobile networks and 
distributed databases is the openness of the systems. Tracking users globally, logging 
their activity, while at the same time providing quality service is simply infeasible. 
Markets and consumers are constantly demanding higher data rates, global access and less 
down time. At the same time, security and trust suffer. In reference to the three measures 
of information systems services - confidentiality, integrity and availability - an official 
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with the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) remarked, “more companies are 
demanding availability first, and care significantly less about confidentiality and 
integrity.” Companies simply want access to their data, their e-commerce markets, their 
customers; if the data is bad, they will fix it later. 
Since trust is difficult to transfer from one entity to another, a strictly 
authoritarian, centrally controlled system will have difficulty developing any degree of 
trust in this system. Not everyone trusts the same certificate authorjties. Will foreign 
entities trust CA’s from the United States or vice versa? No standards of trust for global 
PKIs have been addressed. Will military PKIs accept commercial certificates? Will 
universities accept military certificates? “Fixed architectures will probably not be 
reasonable in the sort of open environment like the internet; something more flexible and 
more adaptive is required.” (Abdul-Rahman, 1996) 
G. MOBILE AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 
There is a trend in computing systems toward highly mobile, wireless and 
distributed systems. Laptops have been around for a number of years. Wireless LAN’s 
have recently become a valued commodity. Palm pilots have been popular for the last few 
years. Automobile manufacturers are predicting the near availability of Internet devices in 
cars. The computing power of these devices compared to their size is enormous. With a 
device the size of a pocket calculator, a user can send e-mail, trade stocks, book an airline 
flight, etc. The security impact of these types of devices is significant. Wireless LAN’s 
depend on radio frequency links. These links are then vulnerable to interception. 
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The reliance on centralized, distributed databases has also grown in recent years. 
How reliable are these databases? How are they populated? Who has access to them? 
Who has write access? 
Data mining is the practice of gleaning computer systems for bits of data 
regarding an individual to piece together a profile to more effectively target that 
individual, usually for business marketing research and evaluation. Some people regard 
this as standard busiOess practice, but others call it an invasion of privacy. Given the ease 
at which personal information ,t is available, identity theft is a potential problem. 
H. TRUST MANAGEMENT 
In the physical world of human interaction, we trust people based on human 
factors. Appearance, reputation, and past social interactions all contribute to the degree of 
trust we place in another person. This is possible because the total number of people we 
have to trust is constrained by time and distance. (Josang & Tran, 2000) We do not 
require a Pentium III processor and a 40-gigabyte hard drive to keep track of human trust 
factors. By contrast, in the virtual world, time and distance are not factors. When we are 
online we have to trust people we do not even see; we may not know that they are even 
there. We have to trust the entire population of people online at the same time, because if 
we are all online, then we are all connected. 
Josang and Tran define trust management as, “the activity of collecting, codifjmg, 
analyzing and presenting security relevant evidence with the purpose of making 
assessments and decisions regarding e-commerce transactions.” (Josang & Tran, 2000) 
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They also identie two basic approaches to trust management: policy-based management 
and subjective management. (Josang & Tran, 2000) 
In a policy-based system, the extent to which an individual or organization relies 
on the binding between a certificate and its owner would depend on several factors, 
including the verification procedures of the CA to identify the true identity of a certificate 
holder, the CAY s security procedures, its operating policy, storage facilities, etc. The 
policy-based approach is a useful from a management perspective because it specifies a 
set of objective evidence which is quantifiable and verifiable. (Josang & Tran, 2000) It 
would, however, require human inspection which takes time, in a world where 
automation is preferable. 
A second approach, subjective trust management, would include subjective 
measures of trust inside the certificate. Credit ratings, background checks, and trust 
metrics could be combined within the policy and transferred in parallel from CA to CA. 
For example, within a certificate, it could be specified how much one CA trusts another 
CA. (Josang & Tran, 2000) This approach presents certain problems. In the PKI system, a 
CA should be the most trusted link in the chain. If CA’s are not all trusted equally, it 
dilutes the overall trust in the system. Also, one CA might not want to advertise its 
distrust for another CA. 
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111. TRUST AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
A. INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Joint doctrine defines information operations (10) as “actions taken to affect 
adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information 
and information systems.” (Joint Pub 3-13) These actions apply across all phases of an 
operation from pre-hostilities to withdrawal and at every level of war. More specifically, 
Joint doctrine defines a set of I 0  capabilities, including, but not limited to, operations 
security (OPSEC), military deception (MILDEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), 
electronic warfare (EW), physical attack/destruction, and special information operations 
(SIO), which may include computer network attack. 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS AS A 
STRATEGY 
Information Operations Integrate Various Capabilities and 
Activities to Achieve National Military Objectives 
Figure 3. Information Operations as a strategy 
This definition, however, only speaks to the science of I 0  and its capabilities. The 
art of I 0  involves integrating these capabilities and achieving the desired effects on the 
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adversary. As illustrated in the figure above, extracted from Joint Publication 3-13, the 
“Joint Publication for Information Operations,” I 0  is defined as a strategy for integration. 
Since the Gulf War, the Department of Defense has attempted to articulate the 
real meaning of 10. JP 3-13 identifies the human decision making processes as the 
“ultimate target” for offensive 10. It is logical then that trust, an integral part of the 
human decision making process, is an important concept in its relationship to 10. As 
such, those involved with planning I 0  need to develop an understanding of trust and trust 
models and mechanisms for creating and maintaining trust in an information system. 
B. RISK MANAGEMENTNNCERTAINTY 
The protected information environment is rooted in a sound approach to risk 
management. Risk management involves anticipating the needs in all defensive I 0  and 
includes planning for both protection and response based on a consideration of the 
information needs, value of the information which may be compromised or lost if the 
protected infomation environment is breached, information systems vulnerabilities, 
threats posed by potential adversaries, and those resources available for the protection and 
defense of the information environment, The value of information most likely will change 
from one phase of an operation to the next; risk management involve consideration of this 
this too. (Joint Publication 3-13) 
In his most recent book, Bruce Schneier illustrates the genesis of how he has come 
to understand modem computer security. “I came to security from cryptography, and 
framed the problem with classical cryptography thinking. Most writings about security 
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come fiom this perspective, and it can be summed up pretty easily: Security threats are to 
be avoided using preventive countermeasures.” (Schneier, 2000) He goes on to write, 
“For decades we have used this approach to computer security. We draw boxes around 
the different players and lines between them. We define different attackers -- 
eavesdroppers, impersonators, thieves -- and their capabilities. We use preventive 
countermeasures like encryption and access control to avoid different threats. If we In his 
most recent book, Bruce Schneier iIIustrates the genesis of how he has come to 
understand modem computer security. “I came to security fi-om cryptography, and framed 
the problem with classical cryptography thinking. Most writings about security come 
from this perspective, and it can be summed up pretty easily: Security threats are to be 
avoided using preventive countermeasures.” (Schneier, 2000) He goes on to write, “For 
decades \vc have used this approach to computer security. We draw boxes around the 
different players and lines between them. We define different attackers --eavesdroppers, 
impersonators. thieves -- and their capabilities. We use preventive can avoid the threats, 
we’ve won. If we can’t, we’ve lost.” (Schneier, 2000) He explains his modem vision of 
computer security: “I had my epiphany in April 1999: that security was about risk 
management, that detection and response were just as important as prevention, and that 
reducing the “window of exposure” for an enterprise is security’s real purpose.” (Schneier, 
-‘* 
2000) 
In decision making under uncertainty, the decision maker does not know the 
probabilities of the various 
be president of the United 
outcomes. For example, the probability that a Republican will 
States twenty-five years from now is not known. Sometimes 
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accurate prediction of a state of nature cannot be made. In these cases, the following 






Maximax (Maximizes the maximum outcome) 
Maximin (Maximizes the minimum outcome) 
Criterion of realism (Weighted average) 
Minimax (Minimizes the maximum loss) 
Decision making under risk is a probabilistic decision situation. Several possible 
states of nature may occur, each with a given probability. Given a decision matrix with 
conditional values and probability assessments, it is possible to determine the expected 
monetary value (EMV) for each alternative. The EMV is the sum of possible payoffs, 
weighted by the probability of that payoff occumng. 
EMV (alternative I) = (payoff of first state of nature) 
X (probability of first state of nature) 
+ (payoff off second state of nature) 
X (probability of second state of nature) 
+ , . . + (payoff of last state of nature) 
X (probability of last state of nature) 
(Render & Stair, 2000) 
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It is possible, within a margin of error, to analyze the risk to a particular 
communications system. It is then the correct application of risk management principles 
which will minimize the risk of compromised data transmissions. 
C. THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN 
"Engagement, while not yet widely embraced as a characterization of our basic 
global posture, seems to me to express quite well what we need to be about in the post- 
Cold War era, that we need to be engaged in the world, and that we need to be engaged 
with other nations in building and maintaining a stable international security system." 
(Skelton, 1993) 
For most of the 1990s and into the 21st century, international "engagement" has 
been and will be the defining term in America's national security and foreign policy 
strategies. This approach has resulted in an enormous increase in the rate and scope of US 
military deployments. On any given day, for example, the US Army has more than 30,000 
soldiers deployed in over 70 nations, not including those soldiers routinely stationed 
outside the United States. To manage this change and the military's implementation of the 
engagement strategy, the US Department of Defense has within the past two years 
required the regional Combatant Commanders to develop Theater Engagement Plans 
(TEPs) and report those plans to the Secretary of Defense. (Steinke & Tarbet, 2000) The 
primary purpose of these plans, according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) Manual 3113.01, is "to develop a process to globally integrate military 
engagement activities." (CJCS Manual 31 13.01) 
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Since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the President has been required to develop 
and present to the Congress a National Security Strategy, discussing at the very least the 
vital global interests and objectives of the United States. The general strategies found in 
this document have evolved from the 1987 and 1988 Cold War versions, which 
emphasized the military as an instrument of power in the containment policy, through the 
1990 to 1993 Bush Administration documents focusing on "collective engagement," to 
the Clinton Administration's "engagement and enlargement" strategies. President 
Clinton's 1995 National Security Strategy highlighted the policy for engagement, stating, 
"While the Cold War threats have diminished, our nation can never again isolate itself 
from global developments." (Clinton, 1995) Engagement has then become the defining 
term for US foreign policy as we enter the 21st century. 
In order to emphasize its ongoing engagement activities and to "operationalize" 
engagement, the DoD requires the regional CINCs to publish their TEP's annually. CJCS 
Manual 3 113.01 defines engagement as "all military activities involving other nations 
intended to shape the security environment in peacetime." (CJCS Manual 3 1 13 .O 1 , 1998) 
These TEP's were initiated to develop a process to globally integrate military engagement 
activities. Why is the DoD concerned about "globally integrating" military engagement 
activities? This answer is not clear in the manual, but one assumes the answer is found in 
both political and fiscal issues. The Department of Defense has been working in a 
resourceconstrained environment for most of the 1990s, and global policy integration 
provides a more efficient use of those scarce resources. Further, global integration allows 
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for a more coherent political application of the National Security Strategy, rather than five 
or six different interpretations and applications of that strategy. (Steinke & Tarbet, 2000) 
The TEP requires each Combatant Commander to establish a Strategic Concept 
for his area of responsibility covering the next five years. Each CINC's Strategic Concept 
and the resultant plan are based upon the Prioritized Regional Objectives as listed in the 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. While these plans are to be reviewed by the Joint Staff, 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services, and others, each CINC retains final 
Phase II 
approval authority for his plan. Once the approved plans are submitted to the Joint Staff, 
Strategic Concept Development 
they are bundled into a "family of plans" by the Joint Doctrine Division. Ultimately, they 
are provided to the CJCS and DOD for review and approved by the Chairman, JCS, as a 
family of plans. (Steinke & Tarbet, 2000) 
- , 
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Figure 1. The Theater Engagement Planning Process. 
i 
Figure 4. Theater Engagement Plan (Steinke & Tarbet, 2000) 
The TEP should be the document from which I 0  in the theater is based. From the 
guidelines of the TEP should come the information campaign which leads to a positively 
perceived image of the United States by the object country. 
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Fundamentally, the TEP is based on trust. That is, trust between countries. We are 
trying to created a trusted environment in which a country’s leadership believes the 
United States will act in the best interests of not only ourselves, but that country as well. 
That trust may be based upon years of cooperation, such as the United States’ 
relationship with the United Kingdom (UK), or it may be more pragmatic, such as the 
United States’ relationship with Russia. Generally, the UK trusts the US because the UK 
has a history of trusting the US and the US has a history of being trustworthy. Russia is 
forced to trust the US to some extent, because it is in Russia’s best interest to trust the 
US; Russia needs economic support if it is to survive. 
D. PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT 
Perception management is defined in Joint Pub 3-13 as, “Actions to convey and/or I 
deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, and objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to 
inff uence officiaI estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions 
favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management 
combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception and psychological 
operations.” 
Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) is the process by which a 
database of potential operating areas is built. Perception management can be thought of as 
the “trust preparation of the information environment.” It is the process of employing 
trust mechanisms to create a trusted environment to ensure our own ability to negotiate, 
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dictate, dominate, and move and maneuver our forces to the greatest extent possible. In 
order to be able to effectively manage another country’s perception of a situation, a nation 
must first create a trust relationship, either positively or negatively, with the target 
country. 
I 0  takes place at every level of war. But it is essential that trust mechanisms are 
employed in peacetime, in the first stage of conflict, and in the post-hostilities phase. 
--. 
I lVFORMATION O P E R A T I O N S  R E L A T I O N S H I P S  A C R O S S  T I M E  
Figure 5. I 0  in the spectrum of conflict 
E. DECEPTION 
Military deception is defined in Joint doctrine as “targeting adversary decision 
makers through effects on their intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination 
systems.” (Joint Publication 3-13) This definition is vague but the goal of a deception 
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operation is clear: to achieve a desired behavior from the adversary. The point then, is to 
build trusted relationships, for the express purpose of destroying those relationships at the 
properly coordinated point in time to achieve maximum combat effectiveness. This will 
require detailed calculations and understanding of how trust is properly modeled as well 
as modeling of an adversary’s behavior. 
The first objective though is to gain the adversary’s trust. Not necessarily that they 
trust us at face value. They must trust the fact that they understand our actions and that 
those actions can be accurately predicted. 
The purpose is to cause enemy commanders to form inaccurate impressions about 
joint or coalition force capabilities or intentions, misdirect their intelligence collection 
assets, or fail to employ combat or support units to their full advantage. (Joint Publication 
3-13) 
F. THEECONOMY 
At the strategic level and higher, much has been written about the transition from 
an industrial-based economy to an economy which is based on information. It is generally 
accepted that this transition has been taking place over the better part of the last two 
decades. It therefore follows that the protection of the information base is a major 
national security priority. 
The Tofflers have described in their works the move from the Second Wave, 
industrial economy, to the Third Wave, information economy. (Toffler, 1980) This work 
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has caused many in DoD to recognize a revolution in military affairs (RMA) based on the 
ever-increasing power of information technology. 
However, to simply recognize this dependency on information as another RMA is 
to fail to see the whole picture. The worldwide connectivity and instant accessibility to 
information does not drive the new economy, the new economy drives the need for 
worldwide connectivity and instant access to information; both in the military and the 
private sector. 
PKI’s will support the process by which we access global information. But the 
real key is trust in our economic systems. As the world continues to evolve into the 
“global village” (Friedman, 1999) foreseen by Thomas Friedman and others, the question 
will be less of competition between economies, but cooperation amongst economies so 
that we all can prosper. 
G. PKI AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
One of the responsibilities of the I 0  community is information protection. By 
providing a means of authentication, confidentiality, and integrity, PKI certainly supports 
that effort. But PKI could also be used in information operations against our forces, or in 
support of our forces against an adversary. 
In time of crisis or war, the government could demand access to a CA and obtain 
access to private keys which would allow them to intercept and read electronic message 
traffic of adversarial governments who used that CA to obtain certificates. With the 
proper certificates, an intelligence organization could mount a large deception operation 
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either for or against the US or one of its allies. As long as the certificates were authentic, 
one could feed the enemy just the right amount of truthful information to appear 
authentic, while keeping key information secret. 
H. PKI IN THE WRONG HANDS/COMPROMISE 
In war casualties occur. Troops are taken prisoner. Camps are overrun. Weapons 
and other assets are taken by the enemy. If every soldier is carrying a smart card with PKI 
certificates embedded on the microchip, will those be collected by the enemy and used to 
his advantage if that soldier is captured? If that soldier’s family receives an e-mail from 
him stating that he has defected to the enemy and to give away all his worldly 
possessions, should they believe him? Perhaps his smart card was confiscated by the 
enemy and they gained access to his e-mail account. 
How easy is it to obtain a PKI certificate? What are the priviledges of holding a 
PKI certificate? How quickly can the priviledges of the holder of a certificate be revoked? 
What is the procedure for the emergency destruction of PKI material? Before we accept 
the PKI system in DoD and place our trust in it, procedures must be in place to account 
for these and other situations. 
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IV. THE DISCRETIONARY-MANDATORY MODEL 
A. INDUSTRIAL AGE 
In the Industrial Age, the predominant form of organizational structure was an 
extremely disciplined, top-down hierarchy of management. The highest level of 
management set requirements and policies which were passed down to the lowest level 
worker whose purpose was to comply with those rules without question or input to the 
process. 
Top-Down Hierarchy 
1 Mandatory Policy 
I 
I 1 
I + I --- I t  I Agent A ; I Agent 8 I Agent C 1 [Agent D I $ 4  1 Agent E i I Agent F . :  . .  . :  
Figure 6. Top-Down Hierarchy 
The most obvious application of this structure was the assembly line. Business 
requirements, for example, production quotas, were broken down into simplistic tasks 
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which assembly line workers were expected to perform without much thought process or 
individualistic input. 
This model worked well in its time and was applied to many different 
organizations: corporations, militaries and governmental organizations. It has several 
advantages. It provides standardization, a chain-of-command, and reliability. It also has 
several disadvantages. It is slow, bureaucratic, and top-heavy. 
However, this model does not work in today’s environment. The speed at which 
decisions must be made today requires successhl organizations to adopt a more agile 
structure, one that recognizes the pace at which technology and business requirements 
change and is complex and adaptive to those changes. 
B. DISTRIBUTED MODEL 
The antithesis of the hierarchial model is a purely distributed model. This model 
would decentralize an organization and its operations from any central authority. In 
effect, a purely distributed model describes a set of disconnected networks; each with its 
own unique characteristics. 
44 
Dis t r ibu ted  M ode1 
Figure 7. Distributed Architecture 
The distributed model has several advantages: speed, freedom of movement, and 
low overhead. On the other hand, there is an entire lack of coordination among the agents. 
There is no standardization to support communication and trust across separated entities. 
Chaos is the dominant characteristic of the purely distributed model. 
C. INFORMATION AGE 
The reality of the Information Age is that a small group of people at the very top 
of an organization’s management structure cannot dictate strict policies without any 
flexibility if they hope to survive. Much of the assembly line structure has given way to 
automation. Only in rare cases are the workers at the lowest levels expected to perform 
only mindless tasks. Today, even the lowest-level worker must be trained and trusted to 
make decisions which will most likely affect his organization; positively or negatively. 
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An example of this is today’s military. The most junior member of a military unit 
can at any given time be put in a position where he is affecting the security policy of the 
United States. A private conducting border patrols in Kosovo, who makes a mistake and 
fires at a civilian, rather than a Serbian soldier, will quickly find himself the subject of 
worldwide news coverage. A pilot who fires a missile into the Chinese Embassy rather 
than a command and control bunker will affect foreign policy. 
The speed at which information moves around the globe today has changed the 
way an organization must structure itself and its communications policies. The power to 
make decisions in an organization must be distributed throughout the organization rather 
than held at the very top. 
D. DISCRETIONARY-MANDATORY MODEL 
Neither a purely mandatory policy, nor a completely discretionary policy are 
sufficient when organizing to compete in today’s world. A hybrid, or synergistic policy 
which takes the most applicable qualities of both and applies them to an organization is 
required. 
The principles of the Discretionary-Mandatory (D-M) model are very simple. 
Enable those at the lowest levels the freedom of making decisions based on their own 
unique situations (Discretionary). At the same time the model allows the necessary 
direction and guidance from the upper levels of an organization in the form of mandatory 
policies, as well as a common set of rules and standards, which reflect the nature of the 
organization itself. 
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The D-M model is a synergistic organizational model which recognizes the value 
of over-arching management policies while at the same time understanding the need for 
distributed decision-making. The real value in the model is that it allows top-down, 
bottom-up and lateral flow of information and trust while allowing decisions to be made 
at the lowest levels possible. 
Discretionary-Mandatory 
Model .." 
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Central Oversight Policies 
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Figure 8. The Discretionary-Mandatory Model 
E. MANDATORY POLICIES 
Mandatory policies are those rules and requirements written by either the central 
oversight or by a peer organization (Figure 8). Mandatory policies should be general in 
scope so as to not restrict too harshly the flexibility and adaptability of the organization. 
No policy can be written which covers all possible situations. 
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In this model, the system will enforce mandatory policies. It is not left to the user 
to decide which policies are discretionary and which are mandatory. Much like the system 
of state and federal laws in the United States. Some laws apply to the entire country and 
some to individual states. It is not the citizen who decides which laws are relevant. 
The need for mandatory policies is clear. In any organization, of any size, there 
should be a common set of goals and a common vision for where the organization is 
going. This is set by the senior leadership. One would not want the lowest level in an 
organization making decisions without guidance and leadership. 
F. DISCRETIONARY PoLrcrEs 
Allowing subordinate levels in an organization to develop their own methods of 
conducting their business, within an overarching framework, provides the flexibility and 
adaptability essential in the Information Age. The speed at which information is 
transmitted and processed requires senior leadership to forego total control and allow 
subcomponents of their company, even to the lowest levels, the ability and trust to make 
decisions. 
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Particularly in a large organization, such as DoD, one would not want to apply the 
exact same requirements on a geographic Commander-in-Chief (CINC) as you would the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). DoD has many moving parts, each with multiple 
diverse missions. Constricting each subcomponent into one set of policies is not the best 
strategy in today’s fast-paced environments. 
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G. RULES AND PRECEDENCE 
M is the set of all mandatory policies from the Central Oversight organization; the 
policies would form the series ml, m2, m3, etc. PM is the set of all mandatory policies 
promulgated by a peer level entity down to its subordinate levels. Likewise, all of these 
policies would form the series, pml, pm2, pm3, etc. 
PD forms the set of all discretionary policies set by a peer level entity and LD are 
all of the discretionary policies formed by a local entity. The policy to the left of the “is 
greater than” sign indicates -c that policy is of higher precedence and overrules the policy to 
the right of the sign. 
In general, mi > mpi and mi > pdi and mi > ldi. If mi conflicts with a higher 
authorit],, i t  would be considered in dispute and resolved by the central arbitrator. If a 
lower echelon policy conflicts with mi, that matter will be referred to and resolved by the 
intermediate arbitrator. For example, the US Navy has a zero tolerance policy for 
narcotics use. To detect violations, random urinalysis screening is conducted at each 
command. When a service member tests positive for illegal drugs, his case is sent to a 
review board to determine the legalities of the situation. The matter becomes somewhat 
subjective rather than objective due to differing legal interpretations of the scientific 
process of drug screening. So instead of having a true zero tolerance policy, the US Navy 
allows each command some discretion depending on the extenuating circumstances of 
each case. 
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MPi > Ldi and Pdi > Ldi. Similarly to the central-to-peer relationship, if MPi or Pdi 
conflicts with Ldj, that dispute will be resolved by a local arbitrator. MPj should not 
conflict with Pdj since those policies are formed by the same entity. 
H. INCORPORATING TRUST INTO THE D-M MODEL 
The D-M model is not a trust model. But it is designed in a manner to facilitate 
trust inside and outside an organization. It does not make a trust calculation or a 
recommendation of trust or not to trust. What it does is realize that trust is a complex 
evaluation and provides the framework for giving an individual the right to trust. 
Trust is a condition which when satisfied allows one party to exchange 
information with another party. Some trust models submit to a calculated condition of 
trust such as Abdul-Rahman. His model calculates trust as follows: 
. .  
For each recommendation path 
0 
tv,(T) = tv(R1)/4 x tv(R2)/4 x .. x tv(Rn)/4 x rtv(T) - 
Merging recommendations 
0 
tv(T) = Average ( tv,(T) ,.., tvp(T) ) (Abdul-Rahman) - 
In this calculation, T is the entity for which a trust value is being calculated. R1 is the 
recommendation trust value of the entity. For example, tv(Eric)=tv(Bob)/4 x tv(Cathy)/4 
x rtv(Eric), where Bob and Cathy recommend Eric by supplying their trust value of Eric. 
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If Eric meets another entity’s (Sally) trust requirements, then Sally will exchange 
information with Eric; otherwise they will not exchange information. 
However, this assumes trust is a one-to-one relationship; that is, Sally either trusts 
or distrusts Eric. Trust is not a one-to-one relationship. Sally may trust Eric with some 
information, but not with all information. The trust relationship may change depending on 
the time of year, or the political or economic conditions -- nothing inherently to do with 
the actual trustworthiness of either party. 
The act of trusting is based on a matrix of conditions as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Trust Transaction 
Figure 9 illustrates how we make trust decisions in the real world; business-to-business, 
business-to-government, govemment-to-government, etc. Trust is based not only on how 
“trustworthy” the receiver is, but also on the value of the information to be passed, the 
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potential payoffs and losses (risk analysis) for each party, the motivations of each party to 
trust or not to trust, as well as the historical records of each party and third party 
recommendations. Ti and Tj are the respective trust factors for each company’s ith and jth 
pieces of information. 
To illustrate, an organization such as the military distinctly classifies information 
into four general categories: unclassified, confidential, secret and top secret. If a military 
intelligence organization holds a certain piece of secret information which may be helpful 
to law enforcement’s efforts to control narcotics, it may give that piece of information to 
law enforcement because they trust law enforcement not to disclose the source of that 
information. But if the military holds a piece of top secret and highly compartmented 
information, they might not give that to law enforcement personnel because they do not 
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trust them to protect the valuable sources fi-om which they received the information. 
The D-M model reinforces trust by providing broad guidance and standardization 
in the form of mandatory policies, but realized the importance of flexibility and 
distributed decision-making in today’s fast-paced environment. In the example above, 
mandatory policy from a high-level organization might be that anything classified top 
secret or above is not to be shared outside military channels. But the discretionary policy 
from a lower level might be to share classified information with law enforcement 
agencies to the greatest extent possible. 
Another example of a business-to-business relationship is the recent snafu at 
Firestone Tire Company. Firestone has a relationship with Ford Motor Company. Ford 
fits many standard automobiles with Firestone products. When Firestone realized there 
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might be a problem with their Wilderness AT model tire, to support their reputation and 
trust relationship they should have passed that information to Ford. However, their 
motivation for sharing that information was low, because there was a high probability that 
Ford would publicize that information and issue a recall. Ideally, under the D-M model, 
Firestone would have had a mandatory policy which states: regardless of financial or 
economic impact, any information regarding safety will immediately be reported to the 
proper authorities and other corporations involved to resolve the matter. That statement 
would go far in instilling trust among consumers as well as potential business partners. 
I. RECIPROCAL TRUST 
It is obvious that a trusted system must consider ways to protect the sender from 
transmitting information to someone who will use it for unintended or malicious 
purposes. However, there also must be protection provided for the receiver. For a 
circuitous system to function, the receiver of information must also be able to trust the 
sender. The sender must be prevented from sending false, misleading, or malicious 
information to the receiver. 
Consider the following example. A car is advertised for sale in the local 
newspaper classifieds. The selling price is listed as $2500. A person arranges a meeting to 
inspect the car and negotiate a transaction. The car appears in good condition and all 
maintenance records are in order. The transaction is negotiated and the buyer writes a 
check for the full asking price of the car. The buyer then drives off with the car and the 
accompanying legal papers. 
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When the seller goes to the bank the next day to deposit the check, the bank 
reports there are insufficient funds in the buyer’s account to cover the amount of the 
check. But the seller has already signed over legal ownership to the buyer. He is left with 
no car and no money from the sale. 
Whenever there is trust, there is risk. But any transaction where something of 
value changes hands, must have support mechanisms to support trust in both directions 
(reciprocal trust). If the D-M model were applied to the system, there is much less risk on 
the part of both the buyer and the seller. The buyer and seller would agree on an 
intermediate arbitrator (a bank) to supervise the transaction. Based on its own local 
policies, the arbitrator would check each party’s background against a database (e.g., 
criminal records, credit rating, etc.) and require a certified check to complete the 
transaction. 
A similar situation could occur in a military setting. A spy, with sufficient 
documentation could pass sensitive information to a foreign military. But is the 
information legitimate? A strictly hierarchial process could lead a military organization 
down the path of deception as happened to the Russians in the Sino-Japanese War. While 
a purely distributed system could permit important information to slip through the cracks 
and be discarded. 
Applying the D-M model, local policies would determine the best course of 
action. But it would also have to be forwarded to higher echelons to make use of the 
information and determine if there is a higher strategic value to the information. 
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V. CASE STUDY - BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION DISSEMINATION 
Figure 10. Information Infrastructure 
A. DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
As stated in Chapter 1, the U.S. DoD has its own information infrastructure which 
Iies inside the larger national and global information infiastructures. It exists to support 
the broad dissemination of all types of infomation; such as tactical, operational, strategic, 
administrative. Physically, it consists of many types of computers, networks, and human 
operators. 
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Different types of information are transmitted in different ways. Tactical 
intelligence is typically gathered by some monitoring agent, forwarded to a centraI 
location to be analyzed, and then injected back into the system to be transmitted to the 
relevant consumers. Operational information, such as location of other naval vessels or 
aircraft, is broadcast to theater units from the operational command headquarters. 
Administratve messages are drafted, forwarded up a chain-of-command for approval and 
then transmitted to a list of recipients. All information is disseminated by first inputting a 
message into the system. The message is then projected through multiple communication 
paths, encrypted if necessary, to arrive at its destination. 
With each step that a message takes in its chain of custody from origin to 
destination, the amount of trust the ultimate recipient can place in that piece of 
information must be decremented. The ultimate recipient will decide to act or not act 
based on a given piece of information. He must understand the process by which that 
piece of information came to him and evaluate it by asking several questions. Among 
these questions are the following: 
0 How accurate was the original piece of information? 
What was the path of the message from origination to destination? 
Could the message have been altered en route? 
What are the human factors that influence the accuracy and precision of 
the message and the information it contains? 
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Failure to evaluate the amount of trust in a given piece of data can result in 
tragedy, even if policy is not violated. In July 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down an 
Iranian jetliner because the commanding officer trusted an information system which 
mistakenly identified the jetliner as a hostile target; this incident resulted in a political 
crisis for the United States as well as adding to tensions in the Middle East. Thus, 
decision makers must know how to evaluate trust in information systems and be given the 
discretionary permissions to make their own judgments rather than following a 
predetermined strict decision sequence. 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The technology which drives Command and Control (C2) systems allows for 
increasing automation and speed of decision-making. However, absolute reliance on 
automation and Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) 
systems coupled with predetermined courses of action may lead to poor decisions rather 
than good ones. Commanders who rely on C41 systems simply as a better way to keep 
track of all their tactical units are misusing valuable resources. 
A better system incorporates the D-M model which allows for feedback fi-om 
individual units as well as discretionary decision-making ability to be negated only by 
mandatory controls fi-om higher echelons in the command structure. 
C. TACTICAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 
In general, tactical information is gathered, processed, and disseminated in the 
following process. A sensor ( e g ,  radar, sonar, satellite, human) gathers a piece of data; 
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for example, an airborne contact. The sensor sends the information to a central location to 
be evaluated and correlated to other information. If the data is deemed accurate, it is 
catalogued, identified and broadcast to all relevant organizations and other tactical units. 
If the data is labeled inaccurate it is dropped from the database. 
/Tactical Unit/ 
Tactical Unit 
Figure 1 1. Tactical Information Processing 
Consideration of this process raises several questions. How accurate is the initial 
information? How carefully was it transmitted to the initial evaluator? Was it a human 
being who observed the contact or an automated system? What are the flaws in the 
collection system? 
Assuming the initial contact is accurate, the second step also brings up several 
questions. Who decides how to classify a contact? What are the behavior rules for other 
58 
tactical units who are in the vicinity of the contact? What information is lost between the 
initial contact and the central processor? 
Lastly, once the data has been evaluated and is rebroadcast to other organizations, 
what is the possibility of tampering with the information? Could insiders, either 
deliberately or accidentally transmit the wrong information? Could an adversary inject 
false information into the system? These possibilities exploit a Top-Down organizational 
structure much more explicitly than one which incorporates the D-M model. 
D. CASE STUDY - BATTLE GROUP CONNECTIVITY 
A Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) is able to conduct sustained operations while 
being spread out over thousands of miles. The communications connectivity via satellite 
links for voice and data as well as point-to-point communications offers multiple paths 
across which data may be transmitted. This allows tactical and operational commanders 
to have access to constantly updated information about time-sensitive situations. 
On the other hand, it also affords an adversary multiple opportunities to present 
deceptive information to our vast array of sensors in order to create confusion or give us a 
false sense of security. In this way an adversary could buy time, make us appear unsure of 
ourselves, or lead us into making a poor decision. 
When a contact is acquired by a sensor, that information is transmitted to other 
platforms via a data link. It is also entered into a database to track over the long term. 
When the data on the contact is received by another platform, it appears on that 
platform’s display in whatever symbology entered by the initial operator and classified by 
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the contact’s type (i.e., air, surface or subsurface) as well as its relationship (i.e., friendly, 
unfriendly, or neutral). It is assumed that the contact was acquired, classified and 
retransmitted correctly. 
But this is not always the case. At each point, mistakes can be made. The contact 
could be a decoy designed to fool our sensors. The sensor operator could be newly trained 
and prone to error. The data itself could have been inserted into the system by an 
adversary with the necessary transmitters and authentication procedures. 
The extent to which one unit is allowed to trust data from another unit must be a 
factor. Just as important is the extent to which one unit should trust another unit with 
information it intends to transmit. In the Top-Down hierarchy it is not. Data is simply 
passed from platform to platform and, because the transmission path has been secured, it 
is assumed to be accurate. In the Industrial Age, when it took expensive, high-powered 
transmitters available only to well-financed organizations such as the military to 
communicate, this may have been acceptable. In the Communications Age, this 
assumption is no longer valid. 
Consider the following scenario. An American aircrafi carrier is steaming in the 
Persian Gulf conducting normal flight operations. It has in company an American Aegis 
cruiser along with a British destroyer and a Dutch frigate. 
The Dutch fiigate acquires a radar contact on an unknown aircraft traveling 
inbound which it classifies as hostile and transmits the track to the rest of the Battle 
Group. The fiigate then loses radar contact with the aircraft but continues to update it as 
hostile in the Battle Group database. 
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The aircraft is then acquired by the Aegis cruiser at a distance of 100 kilometers 
from the aircraft carrier. The Aegis system determines it is the same unidentified contact 
classified as hostile by the Dutch frigate. It is within the air launched weapons envelope 
of multiple theater threat aircraft. What should the Aegis cruiser do? 
Even though our own doctrine and the standing rules of engagement would likely 
allow the Aegis cruiser to destroy the unknown aircraft, that would make little difference 
in world opinion if the aircraft turned out to be an Iranian passenger jet. Alternately, if the 
Aegis does nothing, and the aircraft turns out to be an attack aircraft which launches its 
weapons on the carrier, it will have failed to cany out its duty as a naval warship. 
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The answer then lies in how much he trusts the information coming from the 
Dutch frigate. If there is an established relationship over time, common procedures and 
training to establish trust among the two platforms, then the cruiser can act with 
confidence on the data provided by the frigate. However, if there are no commonalities 
and no cstablished trust relationship, then the trust factor for this individual piece of data 
will be low. 
The Aegis platform might query the British destroyer for its data. Since the British 
ship is more likely to follow similar procedures, training and have similar detection 
systems as the American ship, their data is likely to have a higher trust factor than the 
Dutch warship. 
Properly applied, the D-M model would account for the possible communication 
pitfalls in this scenario. Organizationally, the model would allow communication and 
procedural training to develop across platforms with no interference from a central 
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authority (Discretionary Policies). This process would foster a more trusted relationship 
amongst the platforms. The model would also force the information systems to 
standardize their data integrity procedures by means of central oversight policies 
(Mandatory Policies). 
1. Information Operations 
The process by which tactical information is collected, evaluated and 
disseminated is vulnerable to information operations attacks by an adversary. By relying 
on pre-planned responses and the assumption that information received is completely 
trustworthy, we are susceptible to deception tactics on many levels: strategic, operational 
and tactical. 
In the scenario described above, an adversary could easily inject false information 
into our system, causing us to react poorly and discrediting us as a nation. If we 
mistakenly shoot down a civilian airliner, no one will care if we were deceived and 
coerced into the action. 
The D-M model is the organizational model upon which Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW) should be based. NCW is a concept yet to be defined by our national and military 
leadership. But the D-M model fits the concept. It breaks the paradigm of platform 
centricity and allows tactical units flexibility to achieve the speed of decision-making 
necessary in this information-based environment. It also produces a higher level of trust 
in the information systems by applying standardization to each level in the model while 
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also recognizing that trust is not a simple one-to-one relationship, but a matrix of factors 
including: value of the information, risk management, and human factors. 
2. Theater Engagement Plan 
The scenario above also fits into a larger framework of information sharing and 
trust relationships. The extent to which one unit trusts another unit is important. Equally 
important is the extent to which we trust a potential adversary. 
For example, if the unknown air contact originated from Iran, the established trust 
relationship between the U.S. DoD and other government agencies, would very much 
influence the course of action we would take in this scenario. This is precipitated by 
establishing communications paths through which trust relationships can begin to be 
constructed. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) accomplishes this through its 
embassies and country teams. Militarily, the geographic Commander-in-Chief (CINC) is 
responsible for engaging, or interacting, with the countries in his region by the 
establishment of the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). 
The whole point of I 0  is to make the correct decisions that will lead us away from 
conflict rather than into one. As the globilization of the world continues, avoiding conflict 
to conserve our own limited resources, open up new markets, and secure our own 
reputation throughout the world should be a national priority. The goal of the TEP should 
be to foster trusted relationships with the countries in each CINC’s region and around the 
world. The more trust which can be established between countries, the more successful 
we will be at avoiding the tragic incidents that typically lead to war. 
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E. HUMAN FACTORS 
What are the human factors which may affect the level of trust in this case study? 
Perhaps the ships have been in company before. Their may be personal relationships 
between many of the officers and crew of each ship. Reputations may be known of the 
various actors in this situation. A particular commanding officer may be known for his 
attention to detail while another may be known for a lackadaisical approach to leadership. 
All of these elements are difficult to quantify but will be factored into each 
decision in the process. of reacting to the inbound aircraft. Would the decisions be 
different if the various actors could see each other face-to-face? As Rosenbloom asks, 
“Can trust also be established through videoteleconferencing, rapid response to chats and 
email, and other online media? Which of them are most likely to allow trust to develop 
among indi~~iduals?” (Rosenbloom, 2000) 
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F. INCORPORATION OF THE D-M MODEL 
Applying the D-M model to this scenario, the central oversight actor would be the 
operational commander, in this case the numbered fleet commander. He would 
promulgate mandatory policies to govern the actions of units in the operational theater. 
The peers would be the various tactical units involved in the operations: the aircraft 
carrier, the Aegis cruiser, the British destroyer and the Dutch frigate. Local authorities 
would the the tactical action officers (TAOs) onboard the various units. 
The fundamental concepts of the D-M model apply nicely to a dynamic, fast- 
paced and information-centric environment such as the battlefield. The model realizes the 
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value of the input from the lowest levels; those who are directly involved in a situation 
and have the greatest need for accurate and precise information. 
At the same time, the model also allows for guidance, coordination and 
standardization from higher echelons in the organzation. It also provides mechanisms for 
lateral communication inside an organization as well as communication across different 
organizations. 
The D-M model is not reliant on a single input or piece of data and thus is 
insulated from single points of failure. It is easily applied to the short-term, single case 
decision-making situations. More importantly it applies to the long-term, strategic 
practices such as development of the TEP, foreign policy, economic policy; all of which, 
in their essence rely heavily on secure and trusted communications among many different 
countries, agencies, corporations and people. 
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Conceptually, trust is important to any organization. In order to conduct business, 
leaders need not only to trust their own people and information systems, but also people 
and information systems outside their organization. U.S. DoD is no different. 
In the new economy, the internet, distributed information systems, remote 
capabilities, all will play an important role in day-to-day affairs. The important question 
is how much trust can we place in these systems as face-to-face transactions become 
increasingly rare. As Judith and Gary Olson state in their article about trust in E- 
commerce, “trust needs touch”. (Olson & Olson, 2000) 
The U.S. DoD philosophy in designing future weapons systems and warships is to 
provide remote and reachback capabilities to offset decreasing manpower capabilities. A 
Navy ship which currently requires 400 sailors, in 2025 will require less than 100 sailors. 
Many requirements such as administration, medical services, intelligence services, and 
damage control will be remoted or be provided through reachback capabilities. For 
example, rather than having a doctor onboard, a technician will be provided and led step- 
by-step through a procedure via video-teleconference. 
Reachback capabilities and remote control of operations require a shift in the trust 
paradigm of not only information systems but of the people involved. Who is on the other 
end and what is their level of expertise? What is their background? What are their true 
intentions and motivations? These are key questions. It is difficult to assess the intent of 
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others online. The inability to communicate with someone face-to-face may decrease the 
amount of trust we have in the overall system, depending on the situation. 
B. THE D-M MODEL 
The D-M model is not a computational trust model. It is a conceptual 
organizational model designed to better facilitate trust relationships among actors inside 
the organization and outside the organization. We do not claim the model to be perfect. 
But, in the Information Age, the concept of combining discretionary and mandatory 
policies to provide a synergistic effect of standardization and flexibility is important and 
should be applied to both newly developed organizations as well as those already 
established. Rather than relying simply on strict, mandatory policies, the D-M model 
combines the need for standard policies as well as informed consent and responsibility of 
individual actors to produce an effective, secure communication system. 
C. TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
Trust relationships are dynamic. They are also extremely complex. They can be 
quantitatively modeled by assigning values to various trust factors of a particular entity 
such as reputation or a recommendation from a third party, and then computing an overall 
trust value for that entity. 
But analysis suggests that a trust relationship is far more complex and requires 
consideration of factors which are difficult to quantifl. Consider an automated 
information system. What level of human interaction with the system is required? What is 
that person’s level of training with the system? How trustworthy is that individual? Is he 
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competent to enter accurate and precise information? What is the value of the information 
that is to be transferred? Answers to these questions will affect the degree to which one 
entity is willing to trust another at a particular point in time and for a particular type of 
trust relationship. 
This leads to another issue. Modeling trust presents two possibilities: 
a) model trust such that the actor is an individual 
b) model trust such that the actor is composed of a group of two or more people 
In order to model trust where the actor is an individual requires a great deal of 
granularity in representing the various objects, attributes, relationships, etc. to implement 
an information system. However, modeling trust where the user is a group of two or more 
people may tend to neglect those same objects, attributes, and relationshps when 
computing the overall value of trust for that entity. 
It is difficult to compute a simple, accurate, and precise trust factor for 
communication information among large organizations. The more feasible approach is to 
develop an organizational model, based on the D-M model, which utilizes both 
discretionary and mandatory policies in determining trust among entities and facilitates 
trust among its elements as well as between other organizations, resulting in more 
accurate and timely decisions being made on behalf of the organization. 
D. TRUST IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The US.  DoD, along with most other organizations, must make decisions in an 
environment in which time is an important dimension. Each decision has short-term 
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(tactical), medium-term (operational), and long-term (strategic) considerations and 
consequences. The time frame in which information is communicated is a critical factor 
when deciding the trustworthiness of a piece of information. With respect to information 
operations (10), timing is a challenge for the U.S. DoD: its desire for quick and easy 
decisions, coupled with attribution and cognitive biases, can contribute to poor decisions 
in the field. Additionally, failure to consider the impact of trust at each level (ie., tactical, 
operational, and strategic), can lead to defeat on the battlefield. 
E. INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
Two revolutions in military affairs (RMA’s) are rapidly developing in the U.S. 
DoD: I 0  and network centric warfare (NCW). Trust is a basic concept which drives the 
long-term elements of I 0  and NCW. In 10, developing long-term trusted relationships 
through the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), is the key objective. In NCW, trusting 
information systems to give you a clear advantage in time while at the same time making 
accurate decisions based on the information reported from those systems is the key to a 
successhl operation. Even in coalitions, the faster trusted relationships are developed and 
the degree to which the parts are interchangeable, the greater the advantage will be on the 
battlefield, 
At the heart of any RMA is the way you organize. The D-M model is proposed as 
the most appropriate way for future U.S. DoD components to organize in order to 
maximize the advantage of time as a force multiplier. 
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F. FUTURE WORK 
Modem information systems have created an opportunity for organizations to 
gather more quantitative and qualitative information for decision makers. The ability to 
analyze information faster and more efficiently than the competition pennits 
organizations to better position themselves in the marketplace so as to react quickly to 
changes in the business environment. As organizations become more reliant on the 
World Wide Web (WWW), distributed information systems (e.g., multi - or federated 
database systems), wireless systems and virtual private networks (VPN’s) to 
communicate and exchange information, the need of those same organizations for trust 
models and trust management systems will increase. Organizations will need the greater 
security and better authentication techniques the trust systems offer. Possible topics for 
further research include the following: 
1. Implementation of the D-M Model into U.S. DoD Information Systems 
Network centric warfare (NCW) is the concept on which future DoD operations 
will be carried out. This will require a paradigm shift in organizational philosophy and 
practice and tighter control and better security of DoD information systems. An analysis 
of how the D-M model would support a greater understanding of trust concepts will be 
needed by DoD leadership if NCW is to be successfully implemented into DoD. 
2. 
The D-M model is not a trust model. It is an organizational model which may be 
applied to an organization and supporting elements of an organization to facilitate trust 
A working D-M Trust Model 
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among the entities inside and outside of that organization. A quantifiable, working trust 
model would further legitimize the concepts in the D-M model for producing efficient, 
accurate, and timely decisions for an organization. 
Many computational models already exist. Combining the conceptual ideas of the 
D-M model with the calculations of computational trust models developed by those such 
as Professor Audun Josang of Queensland University may provide interesting, workable 
solutions to today’s security problems. 
1 
3. Quantifying the Human Factors of the D-M Model 7 
Quantification of the humand factors which affect the level of trust in a 
transaction would be an enormous step in developing an accurate trust model. The D-M 
model suggests trust relationships are complex and depend on more than just a few 
quantifiable factors. Human factors are perhaps the most important and complex of all the 
factors. If trust is to be modeled with the user as an individual person, quantifying those 
human elements which affect the overall trust of an organization would be extremely 
valuable in producing trusted systems. 
Quantifjmg the human elements may be difficult, if not impossible. But, if they 
can be quantified, a more accurate trust model of individual-to-individual (iZi), business- 
to-business (B2B), and business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions. 
4. 
Constructing a prototype system which incorporates the D-M model and 
collecting data on the effectiveness of the system as pertaining to trust and security. There 
Developing a Prototype of the D-M Model 
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are many approaches to this concept. A honey pot system could be developed to attract 
users who wish to exploit the system. Deception operations could be mounted against the 
system to test its responsiveness. Conducting red team operations against the system to 
exploit possible weaknesses would provide valuable data in evaluating the effectiveness 
of the D-M model. 
5. 
If the future organizational structure of the U.S. DoD will be based on the 
concepts of NCW, the traditional organizational paradigms of DoD will need to shift 
from the top-down architecture to a distributed architecture. Applying the D-M model to 
the development of future DoD information systems and analyzing their effectiveness 
would add credence to the visions of NCW. 
Apply the D-M Model to U.S. DoD Information Systems 
6. 
Applying the D-M model to a current platform-centric organization and 
transforming it into a network-centric organization and comparing the advantages gained 
by network-centricity to the disadvantages of platform-centricity will add legitimacy to 
the concepts of the D-M model and network centric warfare. Possible subjects of such 
analysis could be an aircraft carrier battle goup, a special operations organization, an 
intelligence network, or an air wing. 
Apply the D-M Model to a Network Centric Warfare Organization 
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7. 
There are several software products available to model organizations and analyze 
their strengths and weaknesses. VITEPROJECT (VITE, 1996-1 999) software simulates 
an organizational structure and provides statistical analysis of the effectiveness of the 
organization. ORGCON (EcoMerc, Inc., 1981 -2000) is another product which performs 
similar analysis. Using these, or other software products, the D-M model could be run 
through several iterations of a simulation to analyze its effectiveness when applied to an 
actual organization. 
Analyze the Model with Software 
1 
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APPENDIX. GLOSSARY 
Authentication: The process used to ascertain the identity of a subject. 
Availability: Ensures that computer assets are fully operational when needed. 
Back Door: An undocumented access code or procedure for accessing information. 
Certificate: A data structure that securely links an entity with its corresponding public 
key. 
Certification Authority (CA): The component of the public key infrastructure that is 
responsible for issuing, revoking and certifjmg public keys. 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL): A list of certificates that have been cancelled 
before their expiration date. 
Ciphertext: The output of an encryption algorithm, or the encrypted form of a message. 
Confidentiality: Ensures that information within a computer or transmitted can only be 
read by authorized personnel. 
Cryptography: The branch of cryptology that deals with the algorithms that encrypt and 
decrypt messages or files to provide security and/or authenticity. (Stallings, W., 1999) 
Digital Signature: An authentication mechanism that utilizes public key cryptography to 
guarantee the source and integrity of a message. 
Domain: The logical realm over which a CA determines policy. 
Hackers: People who abuse information systems or use them to commit criminal acts. 
Hash Function: A function that combines a bit string with a secret key to generate a 
fingerprint of the message. The recipient of the message uses the same key to generate a 
hash value of the message and compares the two hash values. If they are the same, the 
message’s integrity is valid. 
Integrity: Only authorized personnel can modify computer assets or transmissions. 
Key: A string of bits used in encryption algorithms to encrypt plaintext and decrypt 
ciphertext. The string’s length depends upon the type of algorithm used. 
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Local Registration Authority (LRA): The person or organization that is responsible to 
be CA for properly identifylng an entity seeking a certificate. 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The defacto standard for accessing 
directory systems. 
Nonce: An identifier or number that is used with authentication techniques to combat the 
man-in-the-middle attack. 
Non-Repudiation: A message is sent such that the identity of the sender and the 
integrity of the message are strong enough to prevent that party from later denying that 
the transaction ever occurred. 
Plaintext: The message that is to be encrypted, or the message that is recovered from 
decryption. 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP): A public-key cryptography program that was developed 
primarily by Phil Zimmerman in 199 1. 
Private Key: One of two keys used in public key cryptography. The private key is 
known only to the user and should be kept secret. Only the user should have the private 
key. The private key decrypts the corresponding public key. 
Public Key: One of two keys used in public key cryptography. The public key is made 
available to everyone. The public key can decrypt its corresponding private key to verify 
authenticity (digital signature). 
Public Key Cryptography: Cryptography that uses a pair of related keys to perform 
cryptography. When the keys are generated, one is designated the “private key”, which is 
kept secret and the other key is the “public key”, which is available to everyone. Public 
key cryptography is also called asymmetric cryptography. 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): The key management system that ensures public keys 
are safely, efficiently, and conveniently delivered to the system that needs them. 
Registration Authority (RA): In many cases the actual identity verification is delegated 
from the CA to another organization called registration authority (M). 
Root Certificate Authority: The most trusted entity in a hierarchical PKI domain. It is 
responsible for establishing and maintaining the PKI domain. It establishes the policy, 
issues the certificates and delegates responsibilities to lower level CAs or LRAs. It is the 
trust anchor. 
Subjective: The evaluation of an object or occurrence is unique to each person. 
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Subjective Logic: It consists of a set of algebraic operators. It can be called a calculus 
for uncertain probabilities. 
Symmetric Cryptography: The same key that is used to encrypt the message is used to 
decrypt the message. 
Transitivity: In the context of trust, in order for trust to be transitive in a trust path, trust 
must be valid for each member in the path. For example, Bob trusts Sue, and Sue trusts 
Tom, transitivity assumes that Bob trust Tom. 
Trojan Horse: An innocent looking program that has additional malicious functions. 
Trust Anchor: The CA that is hlly trusted by a user. This means that the user has 
complete trust in the CA’s public key. 
Trust Models: They attempt to automate the logic, variables, and thought processes that 
a human performs when making a trust decision. 
Trusted Path: The verification path that a user must take to verify a certificate with a 
trusted CA. 
Virus: A self- replicating computer program. A virus is often malicious code embedded 
in an executable program. 
Worm: A self-replicating program, but unlike a virus it does not need a host to 
propagate, it is designed to spread on its own. It is malicious in that it performs a denial 
of service attack. 
X.509 Standard: The standard that defines the structure and functionality for certificates 
and CRLs. 
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